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Abstract	The	development	of	models	to	capture	large-scale	dynamics	in	human	history	is	one	of	the	core	contributions	of	cliodynamics.	Most	often,	these	models	are	assessed	by	their	predictive	capability	on	some	macro-scale	and	aggregated	measure	and	compared	to	manually	curated	historical	data.	In	this	report,	we	consider	the	model	from	Turchin	et	al.	(2013),	where	the	evaluation	is	done	on	the	prediction	of	“imperial	density”:	the	relative	frequency	with	which	a	geographical	area	belonged	 to	 large-scale	polities	over	a	 certain	 time	window.	We	implement	the	model	and	release	both	code	and	data	for	reproducibility.	We	then	assess	its	behaviour	against	three	historical	data	sets:	 the	relative	size	of	simulated	polities	vs	historical	ones;	 the	spatial	correlation	of	simulated	imperial	density	with	historical	population	density;	the	spatial	correlation	of	simulated	conflict	vs	historical	conflict.	At	the	global	level,	we	show	good	agreement	with	population	density	(R2<0.75),	and	some	agreement	with	historical	 conflict	 in	Europe	 (R2<0.42).	The	model	 instead	 fails	 to	 reproduce	 the	historical	shape	of	individual	polities.	Finally,	we	tweak	the	model	to	behave	greedily	by	having	polities	preferentially	attacking	weaker	neighbours.	Results	significantly	degrade,	suggesting	that	random	attacks	are	a	key	trait	of	the	original	model.	We	conclude	by	proposing	a	way	forward	by	matching	the	probabilistic	imperial	strength	from	simulations	to	inferred	networked	communities	from	real	settlement	data.	
Introduction	Recent	 work	 has	 highlighted	 how	 complex	 societies	 all	 share,	 to	 some	 extent,	 a	 set	 of	 evolutionary	characteristics	(Turchin	et	al.	2018).	Consequently,	the	causal	factors	which	(partially)	explain	how	they	came	to	be	might	be	(partially)	shared	 in	 turn.	 In	particular,	competition	(e.g.,	war)	and	cooperation	(e.g.,	 trade)	across	polities	play	a	crucial	role	in	the	emergence,	evolution	or	disappearance	of	complex	societies.	Previous	work	has	considered	simple	and	relatively	isolated	systems	of	coupled	equations	in	order	to	model	population	and	warfare	dynamics	(Turchin	et	al.	2006;	Wilson	2016).	Agent-based	models	have	also	been	considered	in	order	to	simulate	the	emergence	of	cooperative	social	behavior	(Burtsev	and	Turchin	2006)	while	having	found	wider	application	in	the	social	sciences	(Fonoberova	et	al.	2012;	Gavrilets	and	Fortunato	2014).		We	start	with	a	brief	summary	of	Turchin	et	al.	(2013),	which	in	turn	consolidated	and	developed	on	substantial	previous	work	(Turchin	et	al.	2006;	Turchin	and	Gavrilets	2009;	Turchin	2009b;	Turchin	2011;	Turchin	2013),	including	a	simpler	agent-based	model	with	similar	objectives	(Gavrilets	et	al.	2010).	The	central	premise	of	Turchin	et	al.	(2013)’s	work	is	to	put	forward	and	test	a	model	for	the	evolution	of	large-scale	complex	societies	in	the	Old	World	(1500	BCE	to	1500	CE,	approximately).	Their	key	hypothesis	is	that	intense	competition	in	the	form	of	warfare	led	to	the	development	of	institutions	which	supported	large-scale	complex	societies.	It	is	a	given	that	societies	compete,	warfare	being	just	one	way.	Warfare	intensity	is	in	turn	hypothesized	to	depend	primarily	on	the	spread	of	military	technologies	and	on	geographic	factors,	such	as	terrain.	Other	reasonable	and	competing	hypotheses	have	been	put	forward	(Gowdy	and	Krall	2016;	Norenzayan	et	al.	2016;	Richerson	et	al.	2016).	For	a	recent	review,	see	Mesoudi	(2017).	Turchin	et	al.	(2013)	consider	cultural	multilevel	selection	as	 their	 theoretical	 framework:	 there	 is	 a	 natural	 tendency	 for	 complex	 societies	 to	 lose	 their	 ultrasocial	institutions	to	the	advantage	of	local	ones,	 in	the	absence	of	external	competition	demanding	to	muster	the	
resources	of	the	given	society	more	broadly.	“Ultrasocial”	here	stands	for	any	kind	of	coordination	effort,	e.g.,	institutions,	happening	among	not	genetically	proximally	correlated	individuals	(i.e.	beyond	the	family,	tribe,	etc.).		In	the	proposed	model,	the	Afro	Eurasian	landmass	is	divided	into	100x100km	squares,	each	characterized	by	its	biome	(desert,	steppe	or	agriculture)	and	average	elevation.	The	range	of	agriculture	cells	expands	over	time,	 according	 to	 historical	 processes.	 Each	 cell	 possesses	 an	 individual	 polity	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	simulation,	while	military	technologies	are	endowed	to	cells	adjacent	to	the	steppes	and	then	gradually	and	diffuse	out	via	 conflict.	Military	 technologies	are	 represented	as	a	boolean	vector	 in	every	cell.	Each	cell	 is	further	endowed	with	an	ultrasocial	traits	boolean	vector,	which	can	be	gained	by	occupying	cells	with	existing	traits	or	with	a	very	low	probability	over	time,	and	which	naturally	disappear	(with	higher	probability	than	appearance)	over	time,	according	to	the	cultural	multilevel	selection	framework.	Polities	can	wage	war,	giving	a	 chance	 to	 enlarge	 their	 pool	 of	 controlled	 cells	 and	 to	 acquire	 or	 spread	 ultrasocial	 traits.	War	 happens	randomly	over	borders	of	agricultural	to	agricultural	cells	and	is	decided	by	the	relative	size	of	the	two	polities	and	their	ultrasociality	traits.	Military	technologies,	which	diffuse	over	time	from	the	steppes	to	agricultural	cells,	increase	the	probability	for	a	newly	conquered	cell	to	undergo	ethnocide,	which	causes	the	ultrasociality	traits	of	the	winner	to	be	copied	in	the	newly	conquered	cell.	The	causal	chain	embedded	in	such	a	model	is	as	follows:	spread	of	military	technologies,	intensification	of	warfare,	evolution	of	ultrasocial	traits,	emergence	of	large-scale	societies.		The	model	was	 tested	 empirically	 by	 its	 capacity	 to	 simulate	 how	 frequently	 cells	 belonged	 to	 large-scale	polities	 over	 time,	 a.k.a	 the	 “imperial	 density”	map,	 using	 the	 coefficient	 of	 determination	 (R2)	 of	 a	 linear	regression	between	the	true	and	simulated	data	for	every	cell.	A	large-scale	polity	is	considered	as	one	with	a	controlled	territory	of	at	least	100.000km2	(10	cells)	for	at	least	100	contiguous	years.	As	a	consequence	of	expansionist	warfare,	cells	part	of	large	polities	are	also	more	likely	to	possess	ultrasocial	traits.	Turchin	et	al.	(2013)’s	full	model	accounts	for	65%	of	the	variance	in	historical	data,	while	a	model	without	elevation	(a	key	geographic	feature)	explains	48%	of	it.	A	model	where	military	technologies	are	seeded	randomly	or	with	equal	intensity	everywhere	is	not	predictive,	as	is	a	model	where	military	technology	has	no	impact	on	ethnocide.	These	last	tests	are	particularly	informative,	as	they	rule	out	the	possibility	of	artefact	results	caused	by	the	shape	of	the	grid	and	further	reinforce	the	authors’	hypothesis	that	steppes	and	military	technology	diffusion	are	key	drivers.	In	Turchin	et	al.	(2013)’s	simulation,	time	is	discrete	and	each	time-step	is	of	2	years	(3000	years	in	total).	The	full	choice	of	parameters	was	found	by	using	a	mix	of	relatively	uninformative	priors	and	grid-search	 fitting	 against	 ground	 truth.	 Importantly,	 polities	 can	 collapse	with	 low	 probability,	 positively	correlated	with	their	size	and	negatively	correlated	with	their	ultrasocial	traits.	Further	tests	controlling	for	spatial	autocorrelation	highlight	how	the	single	best	predictive	variables	are	horse	warfare	and	distance	from	the	steppes,	 supporting	 the	 initial	hypothesis	of	 the	authors.	While	Turchin	at	al.	 (2013)’s	model	has	good	explanatory	power	with	respect	to	average	imperial	density,	it	remains	unknown	whether	it	is	able	to	account	for	the	following	historical	aspects:	size	and	shape	of	large-scale	polities,	relation	of	large-scale	polities	with	densely	inhabited	areas	(cities)	and	actual	areas	of	conflict.		In	this	report,	our	goal	is	threefold:	a)	to	implement	and	reproduce	Turchin	et	al.	(2013)’s	model	and	results,	releasing	code	and	data	openly;	b)	to	assess	its	capacity	to	simulate	further	important	historical	aspects	rather	than	 just	average	 imperial	density;	c)	 to	suggest	possible	 future	directions	 for	 improvement	 in	view	of	 this	assessment.	Our	intent	here	is	thus	to	open	and	problematize,	suggesting	possible	improvements.		We	note	that	subsequent	work	from	Bennett	(2016),	expanding	from	Bennett	(2015),	proposed	a	model	which	explicitly	included	demographic-structural	factors,		in	order	to	address	the	following	limitations	in	Turchin	at	al.	(2013):	demographic	pressure	and	its	relation	to	structural	aspects	of	states	and	internal	collapse	due	to	
civil	or	inter-state	war.	While	this	model	is	able	to	simulate	well	the	total	area	and	population	part	of	large-scale	polities,	it	does	not	embed	any	change	which	would	improve	results	on	the	above-mentioned	aspects.	As	a	consequence,	we	focus	on	assessing	Turchin	et	al.	(2013)’s	model	here.			Our	contribution	is	organized	as	follows.	We	start	by	assessing	our	replication	of	results	from	Turchin	et	al.	(2013),	then	expand	on	the	assessment	of	their	model.	We	further	explore	results	for	a	greedy	version	of	the	model,	and	conclude	by	suggesting	directions	for	future	work.	More	details	on	our	implementation	of	Turchin	et	al.	(2013)’s	model	can	be	found	in	the	appendix.	
Baseline	evaluation	We	first	verified	our	implementation	by	comparing	imperial	density	results,	averaged	over	20	independent	simulations	in	the	date	ranges	1500	BC	to	500	BC,	500	BC	to	500	AD	and	500	AD	to	1500	AD,	with		those	of	Turchin	et	al.	(2013)’s.		
	
Figure	1	shows	the	spatial	distribution	of	imperial	density	for	each	of	the	aforementioned	three	eras.	The	left	column	is	the	historical	imperial	density,	the	centre	is	Turchin	et	al.	(2013)’s	results	and	the	right	ours.	From	visual	inspection	of	the	two	rightmost	columns,	it	is	clear	that	our	simulation	very	closely	matches	the	original	imperial	 density	 profile.	 Across	 all	 eras	 the	 locations	 and	 shapes	 of	 regions	 of	 high	 imperial	 density	 are	consistent.	Furthermore	the	spread	of	imperial	density	outwards	from	the	steppes	regions	in	our	simulations	occurs	at	the	same	pace	as	the	original	model.	Even	more	subtle	patterns	such	as	the	distribution	of	imperial	density	in	sub-Saharan	Africa	and	its	lack	on	the	Tibetan	plateau	and	Himalayas	are	well	reproduced.		To	further	validate	our	simulations	we	carried	out	a	linear	regression	analysis	of	the	historical	imperial	density	for	 each	era	against	our	 simulated	 imperial	density	 for	 the	 same	era.	 In	 the	 regression,	 all	 land	 cells	were	considered	(i.e.	including	desert	cells	which	are	forbidden	from	belonging	to	polities).	Table	1	shows	the	R2	values	for	each	regression	alongside	those	obtained	by	Turchin	et	al.	(2013).	Our	values	compare	favourably	to	those	reported	in	the	original	work	with	the	exception	of	the	era	1500	BC	to	500	BC	where	our	correlation	is	higher.		
	era	 R2	Turchin	 R2	this	work	 R2	greedy	attack	model	1500	BC	–	500	BC	 0.56	 0.66	 0.22	500	BC	–	500	AD	 0.65	 0.66	 0.39	500	AD	–	1500	AD	 0.48	 0.49	 0.26	
Table	1.	Correlation	value	with	real	imperial	strength	data	for	Turchin	and	our	work.	
	Despite	not	perfect,	we	consider	our	replication	of	Turchin	et	al.	(2013)’s	results	sufficient	for	our	purposes.	Our	justification	for	this	is	twofold.	First,	we	consider	the	qualitative	comparison	of	the	model	(Figure	1)	to	be	very	strong	and	our	implementation	therefore	accurately	models	all	important	aspects	of	the	original	model.	Second,	the	model	has	a	large	number	of	parameters	which	might	justify	minor	differences	in	results.	These,	combined	with	some	discrepancies	in	the	description	of	the	model	in	the	paper	and	in	the	original	code	still	present	a	number	of	variations	to	investigate	when	seeking	better	fits	(see	Appendix).	
	
	
Figure	1.	Imperial	density	data	(left),	Turchin	et	al.	(2013)	simulated	model	(centre),	our	
reproduction	of	the	simulated	model	(right);	for	three	time	epochs.	
Extended	evaluation	After	having	confirmed	that	our	implementation	closely	replicated	the	results	of	the	original	model,	we	moved	on	 to	 further	 validate	 the	model	 using	historical	 data	 sets.	 Firstly,	we	 sought	 to	 investigate	 the	 shape	 and	distribution	of	polities	compared	to	known	historical	empires.	 Initially,	we	surveyed	the	polities	within	the	historical	extent	of	the	Roman	empire,	as	determined	by	annotated	data	from	Turchin	et	al.	(2013).	This	region	was	determined	 from	the	same	historical	polities	data	used	 to	determine	 the	historical	 imperial	density	 in	
Turchin	et	al.	(2013).	From	our	initial	simulations	it	became	clear	that	in	any	given	simulation	it	is	unreasonable	to	expect	the	polities	to	closely	match	historical	empires	in	size,	shape	or	lifetime	(also	cf.	Bennett	2016).	In	fact,	the	simulation	tends	to	be	dominated	by	a	large	number	of	small	or	single-cell	polities	at	any	time.	Two	typical	histograms	of	the	distribution	of	polity	sizes	within	the	historical	Roman	empire	in	the	years	100	AD	and	300	AD	are	given	in	Figure	2.	The	left	column	gives	the	number	of	polities	of	a	given	size,	whereas	the	right	gives	the	number	of	cells	in	polities	of	a	given	size.	From	these	plots	it	is	clear	that	large	polities	are	quite	rare	and	 though	 they	may	grow	to	a	size	where	 they	contain	a	 large	number	of	 the	available	cells	 they	are	still	typically	 dwarfed	 by	 small	 and	 single-cell	 polities.	 This	 effect	 is	 driven	 by	 the	 high	 probability	 of	 polity	disintegration,	at	least	5%	at	every	step.		
Figure	2.	Polity	frequency	distribution	(left),	polity	size	distribution	(right);	for	different	time	periods	
of	the	area	in	the	Roman	empire.		As	a	result	of	this	observation,	we	decided	not	to	continue	pursuing	analysis	involving	the	specific	shape	or	size	
of	 individual	 polities.	 However,	 we	 do	 feel	 that	 this	 process	 was	 useful	 in	 outlining	 the	 limitations	 and	appropriate	application	of	the	original	model.	While	we	cannot	expect	specific	polities	in	a	single	simulation	to	represent	any	particular	historical	state	or	empire,	it	is	clear	that	the	collective	distribution	of	large	polities	over	repeated	simulations,	expressed	as	the	imperial	density,	closely	matches	the	historical	evolution	of	large-scale	 polities.	 It	 is	 therefore	 important	 to	 understand	 the	 statistical	 nature	 of	 the	model	when	 seeking	 to	validate	or	make	predictions	from	simulations.	Nonetheless,	we	do	discuss	in	the	paper’s	final	section	that	the	
distribution	 of	 polity	 sizes	 potentially	 represents	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 a	 larger	 polity	 to	 fractionalize	 and	therefore	that	a	probabilistic	measure	of	polity	fractionalization	is	needed.		Next,	 we	 attempted	 to	 further	 validate	 the	model	 by	 comparing	 imperial	 density	 to	 historical	 population	records	from	Reba	et	al.	(2016).	The	dataset	contained	population	records	or	estimates	for	cities	spanning	from	2500	BC	to	1975	AD	in	intervals	of	uneven	size	(for	example	2500	BC–1000	BC,	0–500	AD	and	1400	AD–1500	AD).	Where	the	population	data	is	missing	for	certain	time	periods,	we	have	used	linear	regression	to	fill	the	gaps	in.	Each	record	in	the	data	set	also	contained	the	location	of	the	city	as	a	longitude	and	latitude.	Using	these	coordinates,	each	city	was	projected	onto	the	world	map.	If	two	or	more	cities	were	found	to	be	within	the	same	cell	on	the	map,	their	populations	were	summed.	This	resulted	in	a	sparse	population	map	with	a	large	number	of	cells	having	no	population	at	all.	In	order	to	better	match	population	data	to	the	simulated	imperial	density,	a	Gaussian	blur	on	the	population	per	cell	was	applied	(with	a	standard	deviation	of	three	cells).	We	also	decided	to	compare	the	population	data	against	cumulative	imperial	density.	This	reflects	that	areas	of	high	population	do	not	 simply	occur	 immediately	when	a	 large	 state	 forms	but	 rather	grow	more	quickly	in	stable	regions	than	those	in	constant	flux.		The	blurred	population	density	maps	and	correlation	plots	of	population	with	cumulative	imperial	density	are	shown	 in	Figure	3,	 for	 the	 periods	 0–500	AD,	 1000	AD–1100	AD	 and	 1400	AD–1500	AD	 (time	 ranges	 as	permitted	by	the	population	data).	For	each	correlation	plot,	the	R2	value	is	given	on	the	top	edge.	There	is	a	strong	correlation	between	cumulative	 imperial	density	and	population.	For	all	 time	periods	considered	R2	values	were	greater	than	0.5	and	increasing	over	time	to	a	maximum	of	0.75	in	the	period	1400	AD–1500	AD.	This	may	 reflect	 an	 increasing	 quality	 of	 population	 data	 in	more	 recent	 times.	 The	 data	 points	with	 zero	imperial	density	but	non-zero	populations	 in	Figure	3	mostly	correspond	to	cells	defined	as	deserts	 in	 the	model.	These	cells	are	currently	forbidden	from	belonging	to	a	polity.		Finally,	 we	 considered	whether	 the	model	 could	 be	 used	 to	 identify	 regions	 of	 conflict.	 Our	 first	 point	 of	investigation	was	to	count	how	many	times	each	cell	 is	attacked	over	a	simulation.	The	attack	events	were	compared	to	a	data	set	of	historical	battles	created	from	a	concatenation	of	two	data	sources,	both	derived	from	Wikipedia.1	As	with	the	population	data,	the	battles	were	projected	onto	the	old	world	map	and	blurred.	The	correlation	of	attack	events	with	historical	battles	is	in	general	poor.	This	is	mainly	due	to	a	strong	relationship	between	imperial	density	and	the	frequency	of	attacks.	Areas	which	tend	to	feature	large	polities	see	fewer	attacks	as	cells	are	forbidden	from	attacking	each	other	if	they	belong	to	the	same	polity.	Conversely,	areas	where	large	polities	are	rare	see	a	large	number	of	attack	events.	In	particular	sub-Saharan	Africa	displayed	a	very	 large	number	of	attack	events	 in	contrast	to	a	small	number	of	documented	historical	battles.	As	with	population	data,	it	must	be	noted	that	the	battle	dataset	might	be	limited	and	have	better	coverage	for	Western	historical	battles.		A	significantly	better	correlation	was	achieved,	in	this	case,	by	restricting	the	cells	being	compared	to	those	located	in	Europe,	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa,	which	is	the	predominant	theatre	for	the	western	classical	world	and	medieval	Europe	and	the	Levant.	On	the	world	stage,	this	kernel	largely	eliminates	regions	with	low	imperial	density	and	high	numbers	of	attacks,	and	 likely	 focuses	on	an	area	 for	which	battle	data	 is	better	overall.	The	left	column	of	Figure	4	shows	the	blurred	historical	battle	frequency,	the	centre	column	displays	the	frequency	of	simulated	attack	events	and	the	right	column	shows	the	correlation	between	these	two	on	a	log-log	scale.	While	better	than	the	correlation	for	the	entire	old	world,	the	quality	of	these	fits	is	below	those	for	population	data,	with	R2	values	typically	ranging	between	0.1	and	0.4.	Similarly	to	the	correlations	in	Figure	
3,	we	observe	that	R2	tends	to	increase	over	time,	likely	reflecting	an	increase	in	the	quality	and	number	of	data		1	https://nodegoat.net/blog.p/82.m/14/a-wikidatadbpedia-geography-of-violence.		
points	available.	Since	battles	occur	at	the	edges	of	polities,	we	speculate	that,	over	a	number	of	simulations	the	frequency	of	attacks	may	convey	an	intuition	of	the	likely	boundaries	of	empires	where	land	is	contested	and	conflict	 is	more	 likely.	 It	 appears	 that,	 as	we	discovered	earlier,	 the	high	variance	 in	polity	 size	 and	 shape	between	simulations	may	limit	how	accurate	this	result	can	be.		
	
Figure	3.	Historical	population	data,	with	Gaussian	blur	(left),	their	correlation	with	cumulative	
imperial	density	with	a	linear	fit	(right);	for	different	time	epochs.	
	
	
Figure	4.	Historical	battles	data,	with	Gaussian	blur	(left),	simulated	attack	frequency	(centre),	their	
correlation	with	a	linear	fit,	on	a	log-log	scale	(right);	for	different	time	epochs.	
Greedy	model	The	model	was	extended	with	the	introduction	of	a	‘greedy’	method	for	the	selection	of	an	attack	target.	Using	this	method,	polities	are	more	likely	to	attack	their	weaker	neighbours.	Polities	therefore	choose	their	targets	more	 intelligently;	 they	are	 less	 likely	 to	engage	 in	battles	where	victory	 is	unlikely	and	are	more	 likely	 to	exploit	weak	neighbours.	The	greedy	model	proceeds	as	follows.	First,	all	neighbours	of	the	attacking	polity	are	enumerated,	both	land	and	sea	neighbours.	Next,	the	advantage	of	each	neighbour	is	calculated.	The	advantage	is	the	reciprocal	of	a	polities	attack	power.	Finally,	the	attack	target	is	selected,	where	the	probability	of	a	polity	being	picked	is	equal	to	that	polities	advantage	divided	by	the	sum	of	the	advantages	of	all	of	the	neighbours.		
Figure	5	shows	the	imperial	density	at	epochs	1500	BC–500	BC,	500	BC–500	AD	and	500	AD–1500	AD	using	the	greedy	attack	model.	This	attack	model	has	a	dramatic	impact	on	the	imperial	density	with	large	polities	quickly	spreading	to	all	available	cells	at	each	epoch,	even	in	areas	that	are	expected	to	remain	with	relatively	little	development	such	as	sub-Saharan	Africa.	R2	values	for	the	plots	shown	in	Figure	5	are	given	in	Table	1,	which	confirm	that	this	attack	model	less	accurately	models	the	historical	prevalence	and	spread	of	large-scale	polities.			The	greedy	attack	model	makes	polities	very	effective	at	attacking	and	absorbing	weak	neighbours,	so	much	so	that	the	starting	location	of	military	technologies	in	the	steppes	no	longer	has	a	strong	influence	on	the	location	of	early	large-scale	polities	or	the	path	of	the	spread	of	such	polities.	To	confirm	this,	the	simulations	using	the	greedy	attack	model	were	repeated	with	the	starting	locations	of	military	technologies	randomised.	In	these	simulations,	each	cell	has	a	4.34%	chance	of	beginning	with	all	military	technologies.	This	percentage	is	equal	to	the	proportion	of	polity-supporting	cells	which	are	classed	as	steppes	in	the	original	simulation.	With	the	starting	locations	of	military	technologies	randomised,	the	simulations	produce	very	similar	results	confirming	that	the	influence	of	these	starting	locations	on	imperial	density	has	been	diminished.		When	 polities	 choose	 to	 attack	 randomly,	 the	 military	 technologies	 are	 the	 most	 important	 factor	 when	building	large	scale	polities	as	they	increase	the	chance	of	ethnocide	and	hence	the	spreading	of	ultrasocietal	traits	which	stabilises	large	polities.	However,	when	polities	attack	weak	neighbours	preferentially,	the	attack	success	raises	significantly	making	large	scale	polities	more	likely	and	less	dependent	on	military	technologies.	This	motivates	the	significant	imperial	density	in	areas	far	from	the	steppes	(e.g.,	sub-Saharan	Africa)	andalso	accounts	for	the	greater	imperial	density	on	coastal	cells	when	using	the	greedy	model,	as	these	cells	have	many	more	neighbours	to	exploit,	or	be	exploited	by	via	sea	attacks.	Indeed,	if	sea	attacks	are	disabled	this	larger	imperial	density	relative	to	landlocked	cells	disappears.		
	
Figure	5.	Mean	imperial	density	over	20	simulations	using	the	greedy	attack	model	at	three	epochs.	
From	left	to	right	1500	BC–500	BC,	500	BC–500	AD	and	500	AD–1500	AD.	
Discussion	and	future	work	In	this	report,	we	reproduce	the	results	from	Turchin	et	al.	(2013),	and	release	code	and	data	for	future	use.	Furthermore,	we	assess	whether	the	model	is	predictive	with	respect	to	1)	population	density	as	mapped	by	a	city	population	dataset,	finding	a	positive	correlation;	2)	areas	of	conflict	as	mapped	by	a	dataset	on	historical	battles,	 finding	 a	 mild	 correlation;	 3)	 the	 shape	 of	 historical	 polities,	 finding	 no	 correlation.	 We	 further	implemented	a	greedy	version	of	the	model,	and	verified	the	importance	of	random	polity	attacks,	coupled	with	
military	 technology	 diffusion	 from	 the	 steppes.	 To	 conclude,	 we	 discuss	 two	 aspects	 of	 future	 work:	 (1)	proposed	 improvements	 and	 extensions	 to	 Turchin	 et	 al.	 (2013)’s	 original	 model;	 (2)	 a	 network	 science	extension	to	the	analysis	of	the	results,	to	expand	our	understanding	of	complex	societal	dynamics.			Regarding	 the	 first	 point,	 we	 suggest	 two	 ways	 to	 improve	 the	 model,	 without	 changing	 its	 fundamental	hypothesis.	 Currently,	 the	 conflict	 process	 forces	 each	 cell	 to	 attack	 each	 of	 its	 neighbours	 with	 equal	probability.	The	model	results	are	strongly	dependent	on	this	simplification,	as	we	have	shown.	However,	this	is	 unrealistic	 when	 terrain,	 historical	 memory,	 and	 military	 factors	 are	 taken	 into	 account.	 Biasing	 the	probability	in	accordance	to	a	spatial	interaction	model	(e.g.,	entropy	maximization	Boltzmann	Lotka	Volterra	model	 in	 Wilson	 (2007))	 could	 correct	 the	 spread	 of	 polities’	 shape	 towards	 more	 historically	 accurate	directions.	Furthermore,	improvements	to	the	underlying	agricultural	and	terrain	data	resolution	and	accuracy	from	the	Seshat	database	(Turchin	et	al.	2015)	could	also	improve	prediction	accuracy.		Regarding	 the	 second	 point,	 creating	 a	 more	 formal	 understanding	 of	 the	 dynamic	 process	 via	 a	 spatial	interaction	network	could	yield	further	insights	into	the	underlying	spatial	structure	evolution	of	polities	and	resulting	conflict.	Connecting	data-driven	models	with	explicit	generative	models	is	important	to	enhance	our	understanding	and	predicting	the	posterior	distribution	of	history-dependent	processes	and	applications,	e.g.,	peacekeeping	 (Guo	 et	 al.	 2018).	 In	 our	 future	 work,	 we	 propose	 to	 create	 an	 evolving	 spatial	 interaction	network	model	based	on	population	data	from	Reba	et	al.	(2016).	By	inferring	the	likelihood	of	interactions	between	populated	settlements,	we	can	create	a	weighted	network.	The	community	properties	of	the	network	across	hierarchical	spatial	scales	(e.g.,	strength	of	affiliation	to	a	community,	Karrer	et	al.	(2011))	are	likely	to	correspond	to	 imperial	density	 in	Turchin	et	al.	 (2013).	As	such,	we	would	expect	the	following:	(a)	robust	network	 communities	 (e.g.,	 cores,	 as	 in	 Seifi	 et	 al.	 2013)	 to	 correspond	 to	 stable	polities,	 and	 (b)	unstable	boundaries	between	communities	to	correspond	to	higher	frequency	of	conflict	(e.g.,	high	betweenness,	as	in	Guo	et	al.	2017).	Probabilistically,	the	stochastic	nature	of	imperial	density	and	polity	size	(over	Monte-Carlo	simulation	runs)	in	Turchin	et	al.	(2013)	maps	well	to	the	probabilistic	community	strength	and	sizes	in	most	community	detection	algorithms.		
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Appendix	Implementation	We	 implemented	the	model	 from	Turchin	et	al.	 (2013)	 from	scratch	 in	Python.	This	 implementation	of	 the	model	is	written	in	an	object-oriented	style,	which	aids	in	creating	clear	definitions	of	entities	in	the	simulation	such	as	polities	and	individual	cells.	Abstract	classes	were	also	created	for	analysis	of	the	simulation	in	the	form	of	an	accumulator	class	for	collecting	data	over	the	course	of	a	simulation	(such	as	imperial	density),	and	a	correlator	 class	 for	 comparing	 an	 accumulator	 against	 external	 data	 (such	 historical	 population).	 The	advantage	of	this	design	is	that	it	greatly	simplifies	both	making	modifications	to	the	simulation	model	and	implementing	new	analyses.	The	trade	off	is	that	the	code	is	not	optimised	to	reduce	simulation	time	and	is	likely	considerably	slower	than	a	more	traditional	implementation	using	contiguous	arrays	of	data.	However,	as	individual	simulations	are	short	(2–3	minutes)	we	felt	that	the	small	burden	of	extra	calculation	time	was	more	than	compensated	for	by	a	clear	and	versatile	code.		Input	for	the	simulation	software	is	provided	in	the	form	of	YAML	files.	These	are	human	readable	text	files,	which	again	contributes	to	our	approach	of	maximising	clarity	and	usability.	The	creation	and	parsing	of	YAML	files	is	also	well	facilitated	in	a	range	of	programming	languages	through	free	and	open	source	libraries.		In	implementing	the	model	a	number	of	issues	arose.	First,	two	simulation	parameters	were	changed	from	the	values	stated	in	the	paper	and	supporting	information,	following	Bennett	(2016).	εmax	,	a	parameter	determining	the	 probability	 of	 ethnocide	 occuring,	 was	 set	 to	 2	 compared	 to	 the	 value	 of	 1	 stated	 in	 the	 supporting	information	and	Δ,	the	amount	that	the	sea	attack	distance	is	incremented	each	step,	was	set	to	0.0025	instead	of	0.025	as	in	the	supporting	information.	All	other	parameters	are	equal	to	the	stated	values.		Second,	the	spread	of	military	technology	occurs	in	a	manner	different	to	that	described	in	Turchin	et	al.	(2013).	Rather	than	each	agricultural	cell	attempting	to	spread	technology	to	a	random	neighbour	each	turn,	the	spread	is	actually	very	closely	tied	to	attacks.	In	particular,	attempts	to	spread	military	technology	only	occur	after	an	attempt	to	attack,	and	always	occur	in	the	same	direction	of	the	attempted	attack.	The	technology	spread	is	attempted	whether	or	not	the	attack	was	successful,	or	even	if	the	attack	didn’t	happen	(i.e.	when	a	cell	attempts	to	attack	another	cell	belonging	to	the	same	polity).	Otherwise,	the	papers	description	of	technology	spread	is	consistent	with	the	simulation,	i.e.	the	random	choice	of	a	technology	to	attempt	to	share	and	the	spread	rate	
ɑ.		Third,	there	are	some	peculiarities	with	sea	attacks	between	littoral	cells.	To	be	consistent	with	the	original	simulation	it	is	necessary	that	each	littoral	cell	may	attempt	to	attack	itself	when	selecting	a	littoral	neighbour	to	attack.	These	attacks	are	always	rejected	as	cells	are	forbidden	from	attacking	other	cells	belonging	to	the	same	polity.	 Furthermore,	 the	distance	between	 littoral	 cells,	dsea	 in	Turchin	 et	 al.	 (2013),	 is	 the	 euclidean	distance	between	the	centres	of	the	two	cells.	The	distance	calculated	does	not	necessarily	correspond	to	a	
valid	sea	route	between	the	two	cells	as	it	may	cover	land.	Indeed,	this	means	it	is	possible	for	any	two	littoral	cells	to	attack	each	other	even	if	there	is	no	sea	route	between	them	(e.g.	cells	on	the	Caspian	Sea	attacking	those	 in	 the	 Persian	 Gulf).	 However,	 as	 the	 sea	 attack	 distance	 remains	 small	 throughout	 the	 simulation	(particularly	in	the	light	of	the	small	increment	described	above)	this	is	not	considered	to	be	a	large	source	of	unrealistic	attacks.		Fourth,	 all	 cells	must	 attack	 each	of	 their	 neighbours	with	 equal	 probability.	 Practically	 this	 is	 ensured	by	asserting	that	cells	attack	with	equal	probability	in	all	four	directions	even	if	one	or	more	of	those	directions	is	not	a	valid	target	for	an	attack	such	as	a	desert	cell	or	a	cell	belonging	to	the	same	polity.			Finally,	 the	 order	 of	 events	 in	 each	 step	 was	 not	 described	 in	 the	 original	 work.	 The	 order	 in	 Turchin’s	simulation	code,	and	our	own,	is:	1. Each	cell	(in	a	random	order)	attacks	and	attempts	to	spread	military	technology	to	its	target.	2. Mutation	of	ultrasocietal	trait	vectors	in	each	cell.	3. Polity	disintegration.	
